CO129-373 - Public Offices - 1910 — Page 451

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Then as regards the scheme for internationalising the railways in Manchuria, Mr. Knox spoke strongly as to the breach of confidence on the part of Russia in publishing his communication, which was a purely confidential enquiry, the untimely publication of which had put him in a disagreeable position.

Though he spoke as to England without bitterness, the wounded feelings were evidently not yet quite healed, and I thought it best to let him state his case and avoid argument. So, without contradicting him, I said that your policy was dictated In theory, no solely by a loyal desire to preserve the peace so recently established. doubt, Mr. Knox was right, and Japan and Russia had no more right to dictate China's policy in Manchuria than had any other country, but we were dealing not only with documents but with human feelings. Manchuria bad been the scene of a great war, and might be again. Russia and Japan were watching each other like cat and dog. The passions aroused by the war had not yet had time to subside. countries--more especially defeated Russia--were excited, suspicious, nervous. ink of the Portsmouth Treaty was hardly yet dry, and you felt that the only policy was to give that treaty time to do its beneficial work undisturbed. The " door was of more importance to as than to America, and the wisest policy at this moment was to avoid any action which might cause combinations to arise which would make it more difficult to keep it open.

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"One has a right to expect," broke in Mr. Knox, "that one is dealing with sensible men, and not with a lot of over-excited children. And in the meanwhile America and England are to be forbidden to invest their capital in Manchuria, and China is to be forbidden to develop her territory. You will see that things will eventually work out on the lines of my policy, and the rejected stone will become the corner-stone."

"No doubt," I replied, "it often happens that what has been rejected in times of excitement may later on be quietly accepted; but for the present we must take human nature into consideration, and time must be given for passions to cool

down."

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What, I think, rankled in his mind as much as anything was reserved to the end, "Look here, Mr. Innes!" he exclaimed, "I have not only carefully refrained from giving to the press any statement of the case, I have prevented any such statement from being made, simply to avoid embittering our relations, and the only gratitude I have received is that the inspired English magazines have published mendacious articles directed against me, and showing my policy in a false and offensive light."

I said that I did not think we had any inspired magazines, and asked to which he referred. He mentioned some articles written by Dillon.

I had lately read a mischief-making article in the "Far Eastern Review" by a certain Millard, a journalist, publishing a quantity of diplomatic correspondence on the question of the Manchurian and the Hupeh loans, and unmasking with their aid the base designs of England, Russia, France, and Japan against America. I mentioned this and other similar writings of the same author, and asked if he had inspired them. Of course he answered that he had not, and I replied that you and the Foreign Office had just as little inspired the articles of Dillon. He had been assured, he said, that they were inspired, and I emphatically assured him that he had been misled.

The opportunity to unburden his mind did Mr. Knox good. He expressed his earnest desire to work with His Majesty's Government, and we parted with mutual regrets that distance made it often necessary to deal by correspondence with delicate questions when, if the two Ministers could only come together in friendly conversation, all misunderstanding could be dissipated.

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"Yes," he said sadly, "I feel sure that with fifteen minutes' conversation with Sir Edward Grey I could have changed his view."

The great difficulty with Mr. Knox is that he is too much of a lawyer, and too little of a student of man. To him a treaty is a contract, diplomacy is litigation, He does not realise the effect of and the countries interested are parties to a suit. his acts, while being impressionable and impulsive personal contact is more important with him than with many men, and unless he surrounds himself with better advisers than he has hitherto had, correspondence will always entail the risk of misunder- standing. But he has had a lesson he will not forget, and of his sincerity and friendly feeling I have no doubt.

I have, &c.

A. MITCHELL INNES.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

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36747

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

REC

CONFIDENTIAL.

REG 1 DEC 10

[November 22.

SECTION 2.

[42427]

No. 1.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey,-Received November 22.)

(No. 438.) Sir,

Paris, November 21, 1910. WITH reference to my telegram No. 103 of the 18th instant, in regard to the Chinese loan of 10,000,0007, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note verbale from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the hope is expressed that His Majesty's Government will take into further consideration the proposal made by his Excellency that the four legations concerned at Peking should concert to take action with the view of obtaining the joint signature of the loan. M. Pichon points out, in support of his proposal, that it would be a mistake to allow one Power to gain alone the moral advantage of signing the loan, more especially because America, who cannot subscribe the loan herself, would promote her own policy with the money of the European market. America, moreover, is hardly fitted to carry through negotiations successfully which will dispossess her of her preponderant position. M. Pichon also considers that there are serious objections to allow America to negotiate alone the conditions of the loan, a part of the proceeds of which may be devoted to Manchuria in a manner not agreeable to Russia and Japan.

Enclosure in No. 1.

I have, &e.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Note verbale communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Pichon.

PAR une note en date du 18 novembre, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu, en réponse à la note verbale française du 15 novembre courant, faire connaître à M. Pichon que Sir Edward Grey estime prématurée la proposition française, qui tendait une action concertée à Pékin des quatre légations intéressées (pour obtenir du Gouvernement chinois la signature du contrat d'emprunt de 10,000,0001, par les représentants des quatre groupes financiers anglais, français, allemand, et américain). De l'avis du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères, c'est au Gouvernement américain qu'il appartient de convaincre la Chine, les autres légations n'ayant pas de terrain solide pour négocier avant que soit obtenu le consentement du Gouvernement chinois.

Le Gouvernement français, qui a prescrit à son Ambassadeur à Washington une première démarche, pour amener le Gouvernement américain à se prêter à une action concertée des quatre légations à Pékin, et qui a obtenu du Gouvernement allemand une démarche analogue, serait désireux de convaincre le Gouvernement britannique de la nécessité d'une action commune dans cette affaire, en raison des questions politiques qu'elle soulève, questions exposées confidentiellement ci-dessous,

Il estime, en premier lieu, qu'il serait fâcheux de laisser une seule Puissance retirer le bénéfice moral de la signature de l'emprunt envisagé, et se créer ainsi des titres prédominants à la direction de la réforme financière éventuelle de la Chine; d'autant plus que l'Amérique, n'étant pas en mesure de souscrire elle-même l'emprunt, se servirait ainsi pour sa politique propre de l'argent du marché européen; en toute hypothèse, les Etats-Unis se trouvent peu qualifiés pour suivre seuls et mener à boune fin à Pékin une négociation tendant à les déposséder, eux-mêmes, d'une situation prépondérante, au profit des trois autres Puissances.

En dehors de cet ordre de considérations, le Gouvernement français voit de sérieux inconvénients à laisser négocier par les Etats-Unis seuls les conditions d'un emprunt qui doit être, d'après les confidences chinoises et américaines, consacré en partie à la mise en œuvre de la Mandchourie, dans un seus dont les Gouverneinents russe et japonais ont déjà commencé à se préoccuper. L'emprunt soulève ainsi des questions qui donnent à réfléchir aux alliés et amis de la Russie et du Japon.

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